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Non-technical Summary
The recent economic crisis has resulted in a dramatic deterioration of economic growth and
labour market performance in various industrialized countries. There is a widespread view that
economies under pressure associated with high unemployment or low employment rates need to
change their institutional environment. This needs to happen by conducting structural labour
market reforms in order to improve labour market performance by, for instance, facilitating job
reallocation processes or increasing labour market flexibility. Nevertheless, some authors argue
that an institutional reform which is successful in one country might not be equally successful
in another economy. A reform is assumed to depend on the country-specific institutional frame-
work. Despite extensive theoretical and empirical contributions about the link between labour
market institutions and labour market performance, evidence on the impact of changes of labour
market rigidities on labour market performance which take the country-specific institutional
framework and potential institutional interactions into account is still scarce.
This paper contributes to the literature on interdependent institutional labour market ef-
fects by analyzing the impact of interdependencies between institutional factors for the evolution
of unemployment. We follow the general theoretical model of Belot and van Ours (2004) in
order to select institutional factors which are expected to have (interdependent) effects on the
labour market. In order to model interactions in an econometrically correct way, we apply
an innovative model selection approach to this literature, which is combined with a classical
dynamic fixed-effect estimator for a two-way error component model. In doing so, we iden-
tify higher-order institutional interdependencies which matter for unemployment for a panel
of 26 countries with annual data ranging from 2001 to 2008. In contrast to the previous lit-
erature, this paper is the first to focus on the impact of higher-order institutional interactions
on unemployment and one of the first to consider a dynamic model specification in the con-
text of institutional interactions. It thereby allows for a more precise and detailed analysis of
the impact of interdependencies between different labour market institutions on labour market
performance on a cross-country level.
The results suggest that there are substantial qualitative and particularly quantitative dif-
ferences across countries in the labour market impact of institutional changes for some selected
institutional indicators. Hence, the impact of a reform of employment protection, unemploy-
ment benefits, labour taxes, bargaining power, and bargaining coordination crucially depends
on the country-specific institutional setting. Furthermore, the findings are of considerable im-
portance for the theoretical literature. We provide evidence for the existence of higher-order
institutional interdependencies. We further document that especially for changes in employ-
ment protection and the unemployment benefit system the impact on unemployment is mixed
across countries, thus questioning the relevance of best-practice policies.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Die Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise hat zu einem erheblichen Einbruch der Wirtschaftsleistung
sowie zu einer Verschlechterung der Arbeitsmarktsituation in einer Reihe von Industrieländern
geführt. Oftmals wird diesen Ländern empfohlen, Reformen zur Verbesserung der Rahmenbe-
dingungen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt – Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen - durchzuführen, um etwa die
Arbeitslosigkeit zu verringern. Dies können Reformen sein, die Reallokationsprozesse verbessern
oder die Flexibilität auf dem Arbeitsmarkt erhöhen. Allerdings wird von einigen Autoren die
These vertreten, dass eine institutionelle Reform nicht zwingend den gleichen (positiven) Ef-
fekt in verschiedenen Ländern haben muss. Vielmehr hängt der Effekt einer solchen Reform
vom jeweiligen länderspezifischen institutionellen Umfeld ab. Trotz zahlreicher theoretischer
sowie empirischer Beiträge zur Bedeutung von Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen für den Arbeitsmarkt
sind allerdings Erkenntnisse über die Wirkungsweise von institutionellen Veränderungen in Ab-
hängigkeit vom länderspezifischen institutionellen Umfeld rar.
In dieser Studie wird die Bedeutung von Wechselwirkungen zwischen verschiedenen ar-
beitsmarktinstitutionellen Faktoren für die Entwicklung der Arbeitslosigkeit untersucht. Dabei
bauen wir auf dem allgemeinen theoretischen Modell von Belot und van Ours (2004) auf, um
diejenigen institutionellen Faktoren zu identifizieren, die theoretisch eine solche Wechselwirkung
aufweisen können. Um Interaktionen ökonometrisch adäquat abbilden zu können, wenden wir
eine in diesem Forschungsfeld innovative Modellselektionsmethode an, die mit einem klassischen
dynamischen Schätzer kombiniert wird. Auf diese Weise werden für ein Panel mit jährlichen
Beobachtungen von 2001 bis 2008 für 26 Ländern institutionelle Interaktionen höherer Ord-
nung empirisch identifiziert, die für die Entwicklung der Arbeitslosigkeit von Bedeutung sind.
Im Gegensatz zur bisherigen Literatur fokussiert der Beitrag auf die Arbeitsmarkteffekte in-
stitutioneller Interaktionen höherer Ordnung, d.h. einer Wechselwirkung zwischen mehr als
zwei institutionellen Faktoren. Zudem ist die Studie eine der ersten, die ein dynamisches
Modell für die Identifikation von institutionellen Wechselwirkungen heranzieht, wodurch zum
einen Probleme der Modellspezifikation abgemildert werden und zum anderen kurzfristige An-
passungsreaktionen von Änderungen des institutionellen Umfelds abgebildet werden können.
Dadurch gelingt es, ein präziseres und detaillierteres Bild von Wechselwirkungen zwischen in-
stitutionellen Faktoren und deren Bedeutung für den Arbeitsmarkt auf makroökonomischer
Ebene zu zeichnen.
Die Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass vor allem quantitativ, aber auch qualitativ erhebliche
Unterschiede in den Arbeitsmarkteffekten durch bestimmte institutionelle Änderungen zwis-
chen den untersuchten Industrieländern bestehen. Dementsprechend hängt die Wirkung einer
Reform des Kündigungsschutzes, der Arbeitslosenunterstützung, der Arbeitsbesteuerung, der
Koordination der Lohnverhandlungen sowie der Lohnverhandlungsmacht entscheidend vom län-
derspezifischen institutionellen Umfeld ab. Dies stellt auch die Direktive einer “best-practice”
Politik in Frage. Der Hinweis auf die Existenz von Interaktionen höherer Ordnung ist ebenfalls
von erheblicher Bedeutung für die theoretische Literatur, die sich mit der Modellierung der
Wirkung spezifischer Reformmaßnahmen beschäftigt. Schließlich deuten die Resultate darauf
hin, dass insbesondere Änderungen des Systems der Arbeitslosenunterstützung sowie des Kündi-
gungsschutzes Arbeitsmarkteffekte zeigen, die sowohl quantitativ als auch qualitativ zwischen
den Ländern stark differieren.
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1 Introduction
The recent economic crisis has resulted in a dramatic deterioration of economic growth and
labour market performance in various industrialized countries. There is a widespread view that
economies under pressure associated with high unemployment or low employment rates need to
change their institutional environment. This needs to happen by conducting structural labour
market reforms in order to improve labour market performance by, for instance, facilitating job
reallocation processes or increasing labour market flexibility. Despite extensive theoretical and
empirical contributions about the link between labour market institutions and labour market
performance, evidence on the impact of labour market rigidities on labour market performance
which take the country-specific institutional framework and potential institutional interactions
into account is still scarce.
Theoretical and empirical contributions suggest that an institutional reform which is suc-
cessful in one country might not be equally successful in another economy.1 An explanation
could be that institutions do not work in isolation. This is in line with the rising doubt of
best practice solutions across EU member states. The impact of a reform which changes the
level of an institutional rigidity is likely to depend on the entire institutional environment. The
Danish flexicurity system is a good example. Andersen and Svarer (2007) point out that the
relatively low unemployment rate in Denmark since mid-1990 is due to a labour market reform
which complements pre-existing low employment protection and high replacement rates with a
newly introduced active labour market policy. Caused by this reform, labour is allocated more
efficiently through the combination of low employment protection, a suitable safety net (high
replacement rates) and adequate activation measures to avoid the loss of job-specific networks
and human capital.
According to this, labour market institutions have to be matched to each other to work
well. While reducing employment protection is likely to result in lower unemployment in coun-
tries characterized by a generous unemployment benefit system and pronounced active labour
market policies, the reform could have no or even a contradictory effect in countries with low
unemployment benefit levels and/or less efforts to bring people back to work. This example
again highlights the importance of interdependent institutional effects on a country’s labour
market performance.
The implementation of a European semester of policy coordination by the European Union
indicates that the issue of country-specific institutional settings is highly relevant from a policy
perspective. The European Semester is an EU-level policy coordination tool which serves to
ensure that EU members reach the goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy by boosting growth and
employment in order to initiate convergence in competitiveness in Europe. The recent economic
1See Coe and Snower (1997) and Belot and van Ours (2004) for a theoretical treatment, and Bassanini and
Duval (2009) and Sachs (2011) for an empirical investigation of this topic.
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crisis led some EU member countries losing track of these goals. Increasing unemployment
rates, growing budget deficits and low GDP growth rates provoke the need for substantial
labour market adjustments in these countries to both improve labour market performance and
to reduce the governmental financial burden for the social security system, which are both
essential for improving competitiveness. However, the implementation of required adjustments
is often prevented by missing political support or lack of knowledge of which adjustments to
perform. The EU tries to overcome these problems by providing supranational policy guidance
which includes recommendations for institutional adjustments in the labour market.
Such recommendations for country-specific institutional adjustments should have a sound
and reliable scientific basis in order to avoid futile or even detrimental institutional effects,
and to facilitate coordination from the perspective of the European Union. Microeconomic
studies are well-suited to provide evidence on institutional effects for specific groups of workers
or firms. However, such studies do not calculate aggregate institutional effects, that is, for the
whole economy. In contrast, macroeconomic approaches are able to do so. So far, most empiri-
cal macroeconomic studies do not adequately take interdependencies between institutions into
account but focus on isolated institutional effects or on few subjectively selected interdependen-
cies, instead. Theoretical contributions either focus on a single specific interdependency or deal
with a broad but imprecise characterization of interactions. Such limited theoretical guidance
for empirical model specification in combination with an insufficient number of observations is
the main reason for many studies disregarding institutional interactions from a macroeconomic
perspective.
This paper aims at closing this gap by introducing model selection methods which are
innovative within this literature, namely heuristic optimization procedures, in order to compre-
hensively take the impact of institutional interdependencies on labour market performance into
account. To be specific, we follow the general theoretical model of Belot and van Ours (2004) in
order to select institutional factors which are expected to have (interdependent) effects on the
labour market. We then specify a dynamic empirical panel model for 26 OECD countries which
explains unemployment, our preferred measure of labour market performance, by institutions,
interdependencies between institutions, and a set of control factors. This model can then be
used as a basis for the identification of institutional effects on unemployment. There are two
main advantages of this approach over the previous literature. First, the potential impact of
an institutional adjustment on the labour market can be evaluated depending on the country-
specific institutional parameterization. Second, it allows for higher-order interactions without
restricting the model space on subjective grounds.
The results suggest that there are substantial differences across countries in the labour mar-
ket impact of institutional changes for nearly all selected institutional indicators. Hence, the
impact of a reform of employment protection, unemployment benefits, labour taxes, bargaining
power, and bargaining coordination crucially depends on the country-specific institutional set-
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ting. Furthermore, the findings are of considerable importance for the theoretical literature. We
provide evidence for the existence of higher-order institutional interdependencies. We further
document that especially for changes in employment protection and the unemployment benefit
system the impact on unemployment is mixed across countries, thus questioning the relevance
of best-practice policies.
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of existing approaches to
theoretically identify and empirically estimate labour market effects of interdependent labour
market institutions. Chapter 3 deals with the empirical model specification employed in this
paper while chapter 4 introduces the corresponding model selection techniques. Data issues are
described in chapter 5, results of the model selection approach are presented in chapter 6, and
chapter 7 concludes.
2 Literature review
Over the last twenty years, a plethora of empirical contributions sought to identify the direct
impact of institutions on unemployment or employment rates. Earlier studies come to the con-
clusion that rigid labour markets through, for instance, high employment protection or generous
unemployment benefit systems are responsible for weak labour market performance.2 More re-
cent studies benefit a lot from developments in data quality and estimation methods which
improved the reliability of the results and questioned the orthodox view that rigid institutions
lead to undesirable labour market outcomes.3
Yet, the aforementioned studies ignore the institutional environment, hence, the country-
specific institutional set-up, of a country as a whole. As Belot and van Ours (2004) and Coe
and Snower (1997) argue, the same institutional reform need not necessarily have the same
labour market impact in different countries. A reform might have a different impact depending
on other country-specific institutional aspects. This idea of institutional interdependencies has
been taken up in some empirical studies differing in terms of which interdependencies are in-
cluded. Belot and van Ours (2004) specify a model explaining unemployment which considers
three interactions - between labour taxes and unemployment benefits, employment protection
and bargaining centralization, and union density and bargaining centralization. The findings
indicate that institutional interactions are relevant for explaining unemployment in OECD
countries. Similar empirical approaches, albeit with a different and limited sets of bivariate in-
teractions, are chosen by Nickell et al. (2005) and Baccaro and Rei (2007). Bassanini and Duval
(2009) apply a more comprehensive approach. They emphasize that subjectively selecting some
interactions can result in considerably biased estimates due to an omitted variable bias caused
2See, inter alia, OECD (1994), Scarpetta (1996), Elmeskov et al. (1998), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000),
IMF (2003).
3See Howell et al. (2007), Baccaro and Rei (2007), Bassanini and Duval (2009) and Sachs (2012).
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by the exclusion of further potentially relevant interactions. By estimating all possible bivariate
interactions between six institutional factors jointly, and by further applying an instrumental
variable estimator, they take an important step forward by reducing the risk of an omitted
variable bias. Although almost no interaction appears relevant, the authors emphasize that
the findings do not imply that interactions are irrelevant, but that a small sample size might
prevent more precise estimates. The problem of being faced with an insufficient number of ob-
servations is tackled in Sachs (2011) by the application of a Bayesian model averaging approach.
Bivariate interactions between 14 institutional indicators are constructed and their impact on
unemployment is estimated in a static model set-up. The model averaging approach enables
the robust estimation despite a limited number of observations and a potentially large set of
relevant explanatory factors. The outcomes highlight the importance of institutional interde-
pendencies for a country’s labour market performance in the long-run. 22 bivariate interaction
terms are robustly linked to unemployment, and nearly all considered institutional indicators
turn out to be relevant interaction partners. However, neither higher-order interactions nor a
dynamic specification are considered in that contribution.
Instead of constructing interaction terms between individual institutions, Bassanini and
Duval (2009) further analyse the interaction between a particular institution and the country-
specific institutional framework as a whole. This is done by estimating a specification where
the latter is defined by the sum of direct unemployment effects of institutions. Indeed, results
produced with such a model suggest that the impact of an institutional change on unemploy-
ment depends on the aggregate institutional setting. The less rigid the overall institutional
framework, the more successful are deregulating institutional reforms. According to this, insti-
tutions seem to be complementary, i.e. jointly reducing regulation is successful; a hypothesis
which is also advanced by Coe and Snower (1997). While this approach is clearly appealing it
suffers from combining already highly aggregated individual institutional indicators even fur-
ther to an indicator of a country’s institutional setting. If there is considerable heterogeneity in
institutions, this method might neglect relevant institutional information. Furthermore, Sachs
(2011) does not find a general tendency towards complementary institutions. Therefore, we see
the approach of Bassanini and Duval (2009) as a first step we can build on by applying a more
structural approach.
While both aforementioned studies take a large set of bivariate interactions into account,
higher-order interactions are completely neglected. Recalling the example of the successful
Danish flexicurity system such higher-order interactions between more than two institutions can
be highly relevant and existing empirical models including merely bivariate interactions might
provide misleading evidence. But higher-order interactions also matter from a technical point
of view. According to Braumoeller (2004), once a model with two interactions X1X2 and X2X3
is specified, the interactions between X2X3 and X1X2X3 must be taken into account, as well.4
4In this case, X1 and X2 are called the constitutive terms of the interaction term X1X2.
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Neglecting the trivariate interaction term is equivalent to assuming that the coefficients of the
bivariate interaction terms X1X2 and X2X3 measure the impact on unemployment given that
the third variable is zero. Hence, X1X2 gives the impact of X1 on unemployment conditional
on the level of X2 and given that X3 = 0. If this assumption does not hold and the trivariate
interaction is a significant explanatory factor, estimates are biased. It is therefore necessary
to additionally include X1X2X3 irrespective of its economic relevance but for pure technical
reasons.
3 Empirical Model Specification
Our study seeks to first identify relevant institutional interactions for a given set of institutional
factors and second to determine the country-specific marginal effects of institutional changes on
the labour market by taking the country-specific institutional environment into account. The
model selection approach applied in this study is used to generate reliable empirical results
despite limited theoretical guidance. Yet, some theoretical considerations are necessary to
define the set of potentially interacting institutions. To do so, the right-to-manage model
of Belot and van Ours (2004) is taken as the theoretical basis for the following empirical
exercise. In this model, the unemployment benefit system, the labour tax system, employment
protection, bargaining coordination, union bargaining power, and product market regulation
can theoretically have an interdependent impact in the labour market by affecting the levels
and the elasticities of labour supply and demand. More precisely, the labour market impact of
a reform that changes the level and/or the elasticity of labour supply depend on the level and
the elasticity of labour demand and vice versa. Hence, the labour market effect of a change
of an institution can depend on one or more other institutions. Overall, considering the six
institutional factors of Belot and van Ours (2004) adds up to a set of 63 variables (six individual
institutional indicators plus 57 bivariate and higher-order interaction terms) which might be
relevant explanatory factors.
Most econometric studies focusing on the link between labour market performance and
institutions use static models. More recently, dynamic models gained importance in this liter-
ature. While Fiori et al. (2012) promote a dynamic specification on the grounds of a missing
cointegrating relationship between unemployment and institutions; we use a dynamic model
for the following reason. The main goal of this paper is to provide an empirical basis for rec-
ommendations in terms of institutional adjustments. As pointed out by Nickell et al. (2005)
unemployment is probably exposed to some degree of endogenous persistence. This means
that explanatory factors might have an influence on unemployment which lasts longer than one
year. A static model would not be able to adequately capture this kind of influence and reform
recommendations would be inadequate.
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Accordingly, the model explaining labour market performance reads
Y = Xβ + Zθ + Cγ + U. (1)
The dependent variable Y is given by the unemployment rate and is a vector of size NT×1,
X is aNT×K matrix containing institutional factors as well as the lagged dependent variable, Z
is aNT×Gmatrix of bivariate and higher-order interactions between the six variables describing
specific institutional settings, C is a NT×L matrix of control variables, and β, θ and γ are the
corresponding coefficient vectors of the explanatory variables.
The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable entails that the persistence of the unemploy-
ment rate can be adequately captured. However, marginal institutional effects now can only
explain a short-term movement of the unemployment rate, since long-term adjustments are
captured by the lagged dependent variable. This approach is sometimes criticized for leaving
very little variation over time to the explanatory variables. In other words, a large part of the
variation in unemployment is explained by lagged unemployment. If one is explicitly interested
in the long-term effects of institutions in unemployment, it could be preferable to specify a
static model. If one, however, is interested in finding a model which explains short-term move-
ments in unemployment properly, a dynamic specification is preferable. The same rationale
serves for taking time- and country-specific fixed effects into account. Accordingly, the error
term is specified as
ui,t = αi + λt + νi,t. (2)
Here, αi is the country-specific effect which captures time-invariant unobservable determinants
of unemployment. Such unobservables could comprise of cultural or social differences across
countries like the attitude to work. λt is the time-specific effect which takes global events
affecting all countries equally into account. An example for this might be a global recession
which impacts on the labour markets of all countries.
Estimating a dynamic two-way error component panel data model with fixed effects can
deliver biased and inconsistent estimates since the lagged dependent variable is correlated with
αi which is part of the error term (see Baltagi (2003)). Especially for a short time-series, the
error could be large. A solution to this is the application of the Arellano and Bond (1991)
difference GMM estimator. This estimator transforms the model in differences and uses lagged
levels of the dependent variable as instruments. While this estimator performs well when the
instruments are appropriate, it is biased for weak instruments. Thus, Blundell and Bond (1998)
suggested additional moment restrictions by setting up a system GMM estimator. Here, the
system consists of the model equation in differences with lagged levels as instruments, and the
model equation in levels with lagged differences as instruments. This estimator is theoretically
particularly suitable for persistent dependent variables as it is in our set-up. However, while
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the system GMM estimator is theoretically superior to a fixed effects estimator, the practical
implementation is often hampered by the invalidity of the instrument matrix for both the
difference and the level equation, especially when the country- and time dimensions are small
and the time series are persistent (see Bun and Windmeijer (2010)). Hence, we first apply
a simple fixed effects estimator and subsequently check the findings by applying the model
selection method to the system GMM estimator. For the fixed effects estimator, we perform a
recently developed LM-test for serial correlation which is especially adequate for panels with
small T (Born and Breitung, 2013). A penalty is added to the target function of a specific model
if serial correlation is detected. In doing so, we avoid to select models which are mis-specified
indicated by serially correlated error terms.
Validation of the system GMM estimator requires the verification of the following three
assumptions: validity of the instruments, covariance-stationarity of the endogenous variable,
and no second order serial correlation in the residuals. The first assumption is tested by the
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. The second assumption implies that the coefficient
of the lagged dependent variable should converge to a steady-state and consequently be smaller
than unity (Roodman, 2009). This can be tested with a Difference Sargan test of the full
instrument set against the instrument set of the first-differenced GMM estimator (Blundell and
Bond, 2000). Finally, there should be no second order serial correlation in the residuals. This
assumption can be tested with the Arellano-Bond serial correlation test (Arellano and Bond,
1991).5 In principle, each of the three tests should be applied to each panel model that is
estimated by system GMM.
4 Selecting interactions using heuristic optimization tech-
niques
4.1 Optimization Problem
As theory offers no explicit guidance which kind of institutional interdependencies are crucial for
the well-functioning of the labour market, we seek to identify relevant institutional interactions
empirically. This should provide useful insights for theoretical model-builders to incorporate
institutions and their interactions. Besides the ambiguity of the theory, a key methodological
problem in model selection within a multiple regression model when the relevant variables are
not known a priori is the trade-off between consistency and efficiency. Taking a large number
5For the sake of an efficient estimation one can apply the second-step weighting matrix which is based
on the residuals of the first-step estimation. In this case the Sargan test can be replaced by the Hansen J
test which is robust to heteroscedasticity but vulnerable to instrument proliferation (Roodman, 2009). In this
case, Roodman suggests a “collapsing” of the instrument matrix. Here we report first-step estimates, since the
second-step weighting matrix seems to be poorly estimated because of weakly changing regressors, resulting
into unstable second-step estimates.
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of regressors into account increases the variance, whereas including too few variables leads
to inconsistent estimates. In our application, allowing for all possible interactions of K = 6
institutional variables leaves us with 257 models to be estimated including the individual, non-
interacting variables as well as the control factors. It becomes infeasible to estimate all potential
combinations even when efficient methods are used (Gatu et al., 2008). Being faced with this
problem, there exist several approaches for finding an efficient way to obtain an optimal outcome
by estimating only a subset of all potential models within the model selection literature.
Following the (standard) model selection techniques of Leamer (1983) and Sala-I-Martin
(1997), Fernandez et al. (2001) propose Bayesian Model Averaging as a new model selection
technique. In general, these model averaging approaches are used to identify robust and signif-
icant explanatory variables from a large set of potentially relevant explanatory factors. Thus,
model averaging approaches are linked to model selection by providing a rationale for selecting
the set of explanatory factors. This method uses inclusion probabilities of individual vari-
ables to approach the true model.6 Alternatively, Krolzig and Hendry (2001) and Hoover and
Perez (2004) suggest a general-to-specific approach based on statistical tests belonging to the
frequentist strand. Hendry and Krolzig (2004) provide a programme PcGets for model se-
lection purposes which relies on a general-to-specific procedure and searches along multiple
paths. Perez-Amaral et al. (2003) provide another type of model selection tool - a network
approach - called RETINA. In our study, we focus on optimization methods which efficiently
and objectively search through the model space in order to avoid sequential procedures in which
subjective elements prevail. In particular, we apply heuristic optimization techniques as advo-
cated by e.g. Savin and Winker (2012), Acosta-González and Fernández-Rodríguez (2007) and
Kapetanios (2007). These are able to deal with non-smooth, discrete optimization problems.
Recently, Acosta-González and Fernández-Rodríguez (2007), Kapetanios (2007) and Savin
and Winker (2012) have shown that heuristic optimization techniques based on information
criteria as objective function deliver promising results in selecting regressors in different model
selection set-ups of multiple regression models.7 Kapetanios (2007) documents an outperfor-
mance of Simulated Annealing (SA) and Genetic Algorithms (GA) as two classical heuristic
methods over PcGets. The closest to our approach is the model selection set-up by Savin and
Winker (2012) who apply heuristics to a (dynamic) panel model and identify a genetic algo-
rithm as being the best model selection strategy for this type of model. Hence, we apply a
genetic algorithm to select relevant institutional interactions.
An alternative approach to deal with too many potential regressors is using factor aug-
mented regressions (see, for instance, Bai and Ng (2006)). However, for our application, linear
6We do not pursue a Bayesian model selection approach which strongly relies on postulation of priors. In
our application, we do not have any theoretical guidance for the prior specification of the interaction terms.
Second, Kapetanios (2007) shows that heuristic optimization methods, particularly simulated annealing, are
preferable over the MC3 algorithm used by the Bayesian approach.
7Winker (1995, 2000) and Winker and Maringer (2006) already applied heuristic methods for lag selection
to overcome the curse of dimensionality within multivariate VAR models.
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factors might not be adequate, as they could hardly cover the higher order effects we are in-
terested in. Moreover, the variables representing institutions are not highly correlated (see
Appendix table 6) and hence, we might lose information by aggregating the data even further.
4.2 Model selection technique
Let us consider our empirical model explaining unemployment:
Y = Xδ + Zcandϕθ + Cγ + U (3)
where Zcand denotes all candidate regression variables, that is all interactions up to order
six. ϕ is a G×G matrix of zero and ones on the diagonal, depending on which interactions
are selected. As a constraint the levels of the institutional variables contained in X as well
as the control factors C are forced to be included in each selected model. Brambor et al.
(2006) point out that even if a constitutive term (X1X2, X1X3, X2X3, X1, X2 and X3 are the
constitutive terms of the interaction X1X2X3) of an interaction is insignificant in statistical
terms (applying the usual t-test) this is not sufficient to leave out this constitutive term from
the equation. According to them, there are two conditions which should be fulfilled before
a constitutive term can be left out. First, “...the analyst should estimate the fully specified
model [...] and find that the [coefficient of the constitutive term] is zero” (page 69). Second,
the researcher “must have a strong theoretical expectation that the omitted variable [...] has
no effect on the dependent variable in the absence of the other modifying variable...” (page
68). The first condition is taken into account by allowing all constitutive terms to be included
in the model, a priori. Since theory neither provides arguments for the exclusion nor for the
inclusion of specific constitutive interaction terms, we then exclude constitutive terms on the
basis of their particular contribution to the model fit measured by the Bayesian information
criterion.
In line with Hendry and Krolzig (2004) and Acosta-González and Fernández-Rodríguez
(2007), we checked the general unrestricted model (GUM) for validity by assessing our model
set-up carefully. As long as theoretical, data-measurement, and model specification consid-
erations are conducted appropriately the econometric set-up is not prone to the criticism of
data-mining (Hendry and Krolzig, 2004). We tackle these issues thoroughly. We select the
potentially interacting institutional variables by taking the theoretical model of Belot and van
Ours (2004) as basis. Unfortunately, the theoretical literature is not particularly detailed about
the link between unemployment and institutional interactions. Hence, we stick to the variables
for which the selection is theoretically justified. Second, we use recently published panel data of
institutional indicators which is superior to previously used data in order to have a reliable data
basis. Finally, the model specification is evaluated either by performing tests of the final model
or by directly incorporating the test decisions into the algorithm, depending on the specific
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estimator.
Based on an objective function, we seek to identify the relevant institutional variables. We
choose an information criterion as loss function in order to derive a high model fit by simul-
taneously penalizing for overparametrization. As the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is
consistent and seems to deliver superior results in model selection as pointed out by Kapetanios
(2007) and Savin and Winker (2012), we select BIC as our target function. To avoid model
misspecifications, we add a penalty to the objective function if the selected model has serially
correlated errors based on the test developed by Born and Breitung (2013). The null is no
serial correlation of order one. The objective function looks as follows:
f = (ln(σˆ2) + kln(NT )/NT )(1 + penalty), (4)
where k denotes the number of estimated parameter. The penalty applies only if there is serial
correlation in the errors:
penalty =
 0 if p-value > 0.051/p-value if p-value ≤ 0.05
In the following, the genetic algorithm is presented in more detail.8 The heuristic opti-
mization methods are mostly designed in line with the suggestions of Savin and Winker (2012)
for dynamic panel model selection. Genetic algorithms (GA) update the whole set of solutions
simultaneously (see also table 1 for a pseudocode). They rely on the principle of replicating
the evolutionary process such that superior model set-ups have a higher chance to survive. To
initialize the algorithm, we select an initial population (K) of 500 initial solutions as advocated
by Savin and Winker (2012).9 The members of the population are called chromosomes (ϕ)
which are associated with randomly generated binary strings (genes) representing the model
structure. For all initial solutions we perform an estimation, calculate the information criterion
and report the elitist (=best among all candidate solutions).
After the initialization, the generations (Gmax,10 predefined number) start by taking the best
half of the originally generated solution (parents, K ′). First of all, those are directly transferred
to the new population and second, they are used to generate further solutions (children). This
works as follows. Based on 100 randomly selected pairs of parents, 200 children (=new model
structures) are formed by crossing them over. Moreover, the forty best parents - chromosomes
8We also checked local search heuristics like the Threshold Accepting (TA) algorithm as model selection
techniques as well. Since TA delivers worse results in terms of the information criterion, we stick to the genetic
algorithm (see chapter results). This finding - the superiority of the genetic algorithm within this type of model
set-up - is in line with Savin and Winker (2012). More details of TA can be found in the appendix.
9The size of the initial set of the generated model structure (population) should be sufficiently large to allow
for diversification such that a broad range of the search space is covered. Yet, it should not be too large to
search efficiently through the search space finding the best solution.
10The number of generations (Gmax) amounts to 500 (250,000 iterations divided by population size (p = 500)
for each restart. We set the number of restarts to 10.
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with best value of objective function - generate 40 children. This leaves us with overall 240
(C) solutions generated by the uniform crossover mechanism. To get the 10 further solutions,
we use the ten best solutions (K∗) and change them at one random gene. Having formed a
new population, the information criterion is calculated based on the estimation outcome. After
sorting the new population by their objective function value, a random mutation, which refers
to a small, if any, change of the model structure, is done to prevent the algorithm from a
trap in a local minimum. This mutation is applied to the new population except the ten best
model structures (K∗∗) and the ten children generated fromK∗ (elitist). Thereby, eight random
elements (genes) are changed with probability 0.5 over all elements of the population described
before. Again, at this step the elitist value and the associated model structure are stored. The
algorithm runs either a predefined number of generations (Gmax) or stops if all elements of the
population have converged to be identical; implying that the algorithm has converged to an
optimum.
Table 1: Pseudocode for Genetic Algorithm
Pseudocode for Genetic Algorithm
1 Generate initial population K of p solutions ϕ, initialize Gmax
2 for g = 1 to Gmax do
3 Sort chromosomes in K
4 Select K ′ ⊂ K (parent), select K∗ ⊂ K (etilist)
5 initialize K ′′ = ∅ (set of children)
6 for c = 1 to C do
7 Select individuals xparent1 and xparent2 at random from K ′
8 Apply cross-over to xparent1 and xparent2 to produce xchild
9 K ′′ = K ′′ ∪ xchild
10 end for
11 K = (K ′, K ′′, K∗)
12 Mutate K\K∗\K∗∗ at 8 random elements
13 end for
The description of the algorithm is mostly taken from Savin and Winker (2012).
5 Data
The analysis is based on a balanced data set with annual observations for 26 OECD countries
from 2001 to 2008. It holds a set of six institutional variables, 57 institutional interactions, and
four control factors. Summary statistics for the variables are given in the Annex in table 6.
The estimation of a model with more than one interaction term is often blamed to suffer from
multicollinearity. This is especially a risk if the constitutive terms, that is, the six institutional
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indicators, are highly correlated. For our data sample, multicollinearity issues seem to play
a minor role as 0.5 is the strongest correlation observed between two individual institutions;
most of of them are closer to zero or even negative. The complete correlation matrix is given in
the Annex in table 7. In terms of fixed-effects estimation, the problem of imprecise estimates
through rarely changing explanatory factors over time is alleviated. In principle, the fixed
effects absorb all time-invariant influences on the dependent variable. Estimating the impact
of rarely changing variables on unemployment is difficult in such a set-up. However, while
employment protection or bargaining coordination does not change much over time, interacting
rarely changing variables provides substantial exogenous variation over time and enables the
precise identification of interaction term coefficients.
5.1 Labour market performance
Several indicators like the unemployment rate, the employment rate, joblessness, or inactivity
can serve as a proxy for labour market performance. The most prominent indicator in econo-
metric studies has been the unemployment rate. Nickell and Layard (1999) argue that this is
the best measure for labour market performance “because it is probably the least voluntary”.
The lower the unemployment rate the less persons are actively searching for a job and, conse-
quently, the better the state of the labour market. However, measuring unemployment also has
some drawbacks. It is difficult to compare unemployment rates across countries since national
concepts might differ. A country could lower its unemployment rate by job creation schemes.
In order to tackle this problem, the OECD constructed harmonized unemployment rates cal-
culated according to international standards. These series are better suited for international
comparisons of labour market performance than pure national numbers. Thus, our dependent
variable is the harmonized unemployment rate provided by the OECD.11
5.2 Institutional variables
On basis of the theoretical model of Belot and van Ours (2004), six institutional factors are
supposed to show an interdependent impact on unemployment.
The net replacement rate for an average production worker averaged over different family
situations is used as an indicator for the generosity of the unemployment benefit system. It
measures the unemployment benefits as a percentage of the last job wage. Note that this
indicator has recently been published by the OECD and represents a substantial improvement
over the gross replacement rates. This latter factor has been used in nearly all studies focusing
on institutions. While gross replacement rates relate income during unemployment to the gross
last job wage, net replacement rates refer to net last job wages. Comparisons both across
11For Switzerland, no annual harmonized unemployment rate is available. However, the OECD reports
the unemployment rate for the second quarter of a year. This value is taken to approximate the annual
unemployment rate for Switzerland.
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countries as well as over time are much more reliable with the net indicator since differences
or changes in the tax system do not have an effect on the replacement rate. Interestingly,
Howell and Rehm (2009) report only a small correlation between the OECD gross and net
replacement rates. This emphasizes the importance of considering the net measure to take the
unemployment benefit system adequately into account.
The labour tax system is approximated by the tax wedge delivered by the OECD. This
indicator measures the amount of income taxes and social security contributions paid by the
employee, and payroll taxes and social security contributions paid by the employer, as well as
family benefits received by the employee for an average production worker for different family
situations as a percentage of the total labour compensation.
Employment protection can be well described by an OECD indicator which comprises infor-
mation from different dimensions of employment protection. The values of this indicator which
is a metric summary variable of various subfields of protection can theoretically lie within the
range from 1 to 6, and are increasing in the degree of protection.
The degree of coordination between employers and employees in the wage bargaining process
gives the level of bargaining coordination. It can take the values 1 to 5, where higher values
indicate a higher degree of coordination. A value of 5 means economy-wide bargaining while a
value of 1 expresses fragmented bargaining which takes place mostly at the company level. Note
that this measure includes both the formal and the informal dimension of coordination. Soskice
(1990) argues that bargaining centralization only measures the level at which bargaining takes
place. Bargaining coordination, in turn, is a more general concept which comprises, besides
bargaining centralization, of other forms of centralization. Even if a country exhibits rather
decentralized bargaining, coordination could be high with a considerable impact on the wage
bargaining process. Soskice (1990) takes Switzerland and Japan, both with highly decentralized,
company-level bargaining, as examples to illustrate such distinct centralization and coordination
measures. Coordination comes in through higher-level employer organizations in Switzerland,
and informal wage cartels in Japan.
For union bargaining power, the union density, which measures the share of employees
organized in unions, is provided by Visser (2011), and is our preferred indicator. Recently
the union coverage has gained importance as an indicator for union bargaining power since it
covers not only all employees organized in unions but all employees affected by union wage
agreements. This indicator cannot be considered here due to inadequate coverage over time.
An indicator for product market regulation is available from the Fraser Institute which
publishes the Economic Freedom of the World Index (Gwartney et al., 2012). This measure
measure lies in the range from 1 to 10 and comprises information on business regulations
stemming from seven sources: price controls, administrative requirements, bureaucracy costs,
starting a business, extra payments/bribes/favoritism, licensing restrictions, and cost of tax
compliance. In the original data source, the value is decreasing in the degree of regulation. In
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order to ensure that deregulation is linked to decreasing indicator values for the institutional
factors we multiply the product market regulation value with -1.
5.3 Control factors
Similar to Fiori et al. (2012), the output gap, which gives the percentage deviation of the cyclical
component from trend growth, is used to control for cyclical fluctuations in (un)employment.
Trend growth is calculated on the basis of a production function. Following Amable et al. (2011),
three additional factors, the first time difference of the real exchange rate, the structural trade
balance, and the average labour productivity are used as control factors. The data series are
provided by the OECD via its Economic Outlook.
6 Results
The basic estimation approach is to apply the genetic algorithm as the preferred model selection
tool in combination with a simple dynamic fixed effects estimator.12 Theoretically, system
GMM is superior but might be plagued by difficulties to determine the optimal instrumental
variable structure. We later run the model selection approach with the system GMM estimator
as a robustness check. While the statistical identification of relevant interaction terms can be
reliably done with the model selection approach applied in this paper, a further step is needed
to provide an economic interpretation of this finding. This is done by calculating marginal
effects of the institutional factors. Assume the following model where the dependent variable Y
is explained by three factors X1,X2 and X3, and all possible interactions between these factors:
Y = β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X1X2 + β5X1X3 + β6X2X3 + β7X1X2X3 +  (5)
The marginal effect of a factor X1 on Y is then calculated as the first derivative of Y with
respect to X1
δY
δX1
= β1 + β4X2 + β5X3 + β7X2X3. (6)
Hence, the marginal effect of X1 on Y depends on the estimated coefficients as well as on the
level of X2 and X3 for a specific cross-section and a specific point in time. If an interaction term
coefficient is not significantly different from zero, it can be left out and the corresponding levels
are not relevant. Based on this example, marginal effects can be calculated for all countries
on our sample for a given year. The marginal effect then shows what would happen to the
unemployment rate if the value of an institutional indicator changed. Consequently, a positive
12This is equivalent to what has been reported by Savin and Winker (2012) who, on the basis of Monte-Carlo
simulations, identified the genetic algorithm as the superior model selection tool.
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marginal effect means that (de)regulation would raise (lower) unemployment. To illustrate our
findings, we calculate the marginal effects for the institutional level in 2008 since this is the
latest available observation. Following Greene (2002) (page 124), we calculate the standard
errors for the marginal effects. This is more complex than for estimates without conditioning
variables since we have to take covariances between interacting factors into account. More
specifically, for the model given above, the standard error for the marginal effect of X1 for
instance, is given by
σ =
√
var(β1) +X22var(β4) +X23var(β5) +X22X23var(β7) + 2X2cov(β1, β4) + ...
...2X3cov(β1, β5) + 2X2X3cov(β4, β5) + 2X22X3cov(β4, β7) + 2X2X23cov(β5, β7) (7)
This standard error provides information on the precision of the estimation of the marginal
effect for given values of the conditioning factors (X1, X2 and X3 in the example given above).
Hence, similar to the marginal effect, the standard errors depend on the country-specific insti-
tutional framework and can be calculated for each country separately. The information which
is conveyed by the standard errors refers to the precision of the estimated marginal effect. A
comparably low country-specific standard error indicates a low level of uncertainty surrounding
the country-specific marginal effect. In contrast, high standard errors raise some doubts about
the precise measurement of the marginal effect.
6.1 Fixed effects
The genetic algorithm identifies seven interactions as significant determinants of unemployment
for the fixed effects estimator. Recall that we include the levels of the institutional variables
in each model specification. Five variables are considered in at least one significant interaction
term. Only the product market regulation variable does not interact with another institutional
factor. This is contrary to recent evidence on a significant interdependent impact between
labour and product market regulation on the labour market (Fiori et al., 2012). This unexpected
finding could be the result of the particular modelling strategy which allows the comprehensive
consideration of interdependencies. The interaction between product market regulation and
labour market regulation in the literature could be driven by an omitted variable bias due to
neglecting further relevant interactions. Alternatively, we cannot rule out that there simply has
not been an interdependent relationship between labour and product market regulation for the
specific country sample and time period in this study. The insignificant coefficient of product
market regulation (see table 4) points in this direction. In summary, there is a conditioning
effect from other institutions for a change of five institutional factors. This highlights the
importance of interdependent institutional influences on the labour market and the need for
considering the country-specific institutional set-up when conducting labour market reforms.
Furthermore, the appearance of higher-order interaction terms in the finally selected model
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emphasizes the complexity of the interplay of different institutional factors. This is of particular
relevance for theoretical models builders who should not restrict their models to bivariate or
subjectively selected interactions.
A deeper look into the results reveals that four bivariate interactions, employment protec-
tion and the net replacement rate, the net replacement rate and either labour taxes and union
density, as well as bargaining coordination and union density have a relevant influence on unem-
ployment. Furthermore, the trivariate interaction terms between, first, employment protection,
labour taxes and bargaining coordination, and, second, between the net replacement rate, bar-
gaining coordination and union density, as well as the fourfold interaction between employment
protection, the net replacement rate, labour taxes and bargaining coordination appear to be
important for unemployment.
The results displayed in table 2 show that especially deregulating reforms of labour taxes,
product market regulation, bargaining coordination and bargaining power (approximated by
union density) have the potential to reduce unemployment in the majority of countries since
the majority of marginal effects of these factors are positive. Overall, lowering the taxation of
labour is correlated with a reduction in unemployment in 19 countries out of 26 of the sample,
while lowering the workers’ bargaining power as well as increasing competition in the product
market would be successful in all 26 countries. In contrast, reducing the level of employment
protection and the level of unemployment benefits would have detrimental labour market effects
in the majority of countries. This can at least partly explain the mixed impact of a change in
employment protection and unemployment benefits on the labour market (Howell et al., 2007).
The particular outcome of a change in the respective institution depends on other institutional
factors. While our results suggest that increasing product market competition is beneficial for
the labour market, this estimate is not significantly different from zero.13
Table 2: Marginal institutional effects (fixed effects)
Employ-
ment
protection
Re-
place-
ment
rate
Labour
taxes
Bargain-
ing
coordina-
tion
Union
den-
sity
Product
market
regulation
Number of positive
marginal effects out of
26 countries
7 9 19 22 26 26
A positive marginal effect means that regulation (which means a higher level of the institu-
tional indicator) is linked to a higher unemployment rate. Correspondingly, deregulation is
then correlated with improved labour market performance.
In the following, we compare labour market effects through institutional changes for differ-
13It nevertheless appears in the result tables since the level of all six institutional factors are forced to be
included in the selected model.
16
ent groups of countries which are often assumed to differ in their institutional design: Scan-
dinavian countries (Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark), Middle-European countries (France,
Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, Austria), Anglo-Saxon and Asian countries (Aus-
tralia, Canada, Ireland, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States), Southern-
European countries (Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece), and Eastern-European countries (Czech
Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland). Indeed, we find substantial differences in the esti-
mated labour market reactions following an institutional change across groups. The groups of
Southern-European, Middle-European countries and Eastern-European countries mostly show
positive marginal effects. Hence, an institutional change that deregulates the institutional set-
up would lead to a fall in unemployment in these countries. In contrast, especially in the
Anglo-Saxon and Asian, but also in the Scandinavian countries the picture is somewhat dif-
ferent. Here, deregulation would to a larger extent have a detrimental impact on the labour
market. The following table 3 summarizes the group-specific marginal institutional impact on
unemployment by showing the share of countries with positive marginal effects (decrease in the
level of regulation leads to an increase in unemployment). The most heterogeneous outcome
for the different groups can be observed for employment protection, unemployment benefits
and labour taxes. Reducing the level of employment protection is linked to a drop especially in
unemployment only in Southern-European and Middle-European countries while it has a detri-
mental labour market impact in all remaining groups. Concerning unemployment benefits,
Eastern-European countries show a close relation between a reduction in the net replacement
rate and the unemployment rate. In the other groups, the same relation is only given for a
small subset of countries. Generally, the interpretation for marginal institutional effects based
on interdependencies is difficult since clear theoretical predictions are not available for all in-
stitutional factors, and since interdependencies comprise up to four factors. Nevertheless, some
considerations on the interaction effects are given in the following to illustrate how the same
reform can produce opposing outcomes.
According to Arpaia and Mourre (2012), employment protection is particularly relevant in
countries where redistribution policies are inefficiently organized and insurance against labour
market risks (becoming unemployed) is therefore limited. Hence, the level of employment
protection should be high in countries with a low level of unemployment benefits. However,
there is a positive correlation between the level of employment protection and net replacement
rates in our data sample. Countries with strict employment protection also exhibit a generous
unemployment benefit system (see table 7). Yet, this could explain why reducing employment
protection would be beneficial in countries with high unemployment benefits (and vice-versa).
The combination of high regulation of both factors is not efficient and one of the two factors
could be deregulated without generating negative labour market effects. According to our
findings, the interdependent labour market effect of employment protection and unemployment
benefits also depends on the labour tax system and the degree of bargaining coordination.
More specifically, countries with a higher degree of bargaining coordination as well as with
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higher labour taxes are more likely to show a beneficial labour market impact through reducing
employment protection. Especially bargaining coordination could work as a moderating factor.
Potential externalities of the EPL reduction are likely to be compensated through the
absence of non-coordinated behaviour of either employers or employees (Baccaro and Rei, 2007).
For instance, informal agreements between the employer and the worker side (what is captured
in the coordination variable) could avoid that the increase in employer bargaining coordination
(due to the loss in EPL strictness) transforms in increased labour transition rates, lower wages
and, consequently, less labour supply.
In contrast to employment protection, reducing unemployment benefits additionally de-
pends on the level of union density (besides the interdependency with employment protec-
tion, labour taxes and bargaining coordination). The results show that reducing net replace-
ment rates is beneficial in countries where the level of worker bargaining power (measured by
union density) is comparably low. Lower unemployment benefits increase labour supply since
the outside option becomes less attractive. Since the increased labour supply is especially
unemployment-reducing in countries with low union density we can assume that this effect is
mainly driven by moderate wage claims through low union density.
Table 3: Share of positive marginal institutional effects: Country groups
Employ-
ment
protection
Re-
place-
ment
rate
Labour
taxes
Bargaining
coordina-
tion
Union
den-
sity
Product
market
regulation
Anglo-Saxon+Asian (8) 0 0.25 0.375 0.75 1 1
Eastern-European (4) 0 1 0.75 1 1 1
Southern-European (4) 0.75 0.25 0.75 1 1 1
Middle-European (6) 0.67 0.17 1 1 1 1
Scandinavian (4) 0 0.25 1 0.5 1 1
A positive marginal effect means that regulation (which means a higher level of the institu-
tional indicator) is linked to a higher unemployment rate. Correspondingly, deregulation is
then correlated with improved labour market performance. Each value reflects the share of
positive marginal effects within a country group to the number of countries in that group.
Hence, the higher the value the more likely is a positive marginal effect in that group. The
number of countries in a group is given in parentheses.
Table 3 as well as the estimated marginal effects provided in table 4 suggest that insti-
tutional reforms provide the opportunity to reduce unemployment in all countries. Table 4
provides the marginal effects for 5 selected countries, one from each group, for all six institu-
tional factors.
Concerning employment protection, an increase in the EPL indicator (ranging from 1 to 6)
by one point would change unemployment by between -4.7 and 0.25 percentage points depending
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Table 4: Marginal institutional effects for selected countries
Employ-
ment
protection
Replacement
rate
Labour
taxes
Bargaining
coordina-
tion
Union
density
Product
market
regulation
Australia -4.718
(0.937)
-0.078
(0.040)
-0.086
(0.048)
0.191
(0.308)
0.343
(0.055)
0.110
(0.125)
Czech Rep. -1.098
(0.402)
0.097
(0.030)
0.023
(0.039)
1.409
(0.264)
0.236
(0.042)
0.110
(0.125)
Spain -0.152
(0.543)
-0.070
(0.070)
0.075
(0.053)
1.408
(0.325)
0.144
(0.044)
0.110
(0.125)
Germany 0.246
(0.611)
-0.113
(0.045)
0.071
(0.045)
1.431
(0.289)
0.139
(0.044)
0.110
(0.125)
Sweden -0.237
(0.460)
-0.088
(0.047)
0.046
(0.041)
-0.905
(0.318)
0.183
(0.042)
0.110
(0.125)
A positive marginal effect means that regulation (which means a higher level of the institu-
tional indicator) is linked to a higher unemployment rate. Correspondingly, deregulation is
then correlated with improved labour market performance. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
on the country. Besides the relevance of interdependencies with other institutional factors,
this wide range might be further explained by the fact that the EPL indicator comprises of
both protection for temporary and for permanent employment. Recent evidence suggests that
both elements work in opposite directions (Sachs, 2012). More concretely, reductions in the
regulation of flexible employment are likely to increase unemployment (Cahuc and Postel-Vinay,
2002; Blanchard and Landier, 2002). If changes in employment protection have been mainly
driven by changes of the regulation of flexible employment in the sample period, the negative
marginal effects are not surprising.
A reduction in the net replacement rate by 1 percentage point would be related to an
unemployment rate which is 0.1 percentage points lower in the Czech Republic, and around
0.1 percentage points higher in Australia, Sweden, Germany and Spain. In contrast, reducing
labour taxes by one percentage point corresponds to higher unemployment in Australia (+0.08
percentage points), and to lower unemployment in the remaining four countries (-0.02 and
0.08 percentage points). While these effects are rather small in economic terms, changing the
bargaining power (proxied by the union density) shows larger effects. A reduction in the union
density by 1 percentage point is linked to a reduction in the unemployment rate between 0.14
and 0.34 percentage points. Since product market regulation does not interact with other
institutional factors in our sample the effect on unemployment is identical for all countries. A
rise in competition (a fall of the indicator value by one point) due to, for instance, decreased
bureaucracy costs or a reduction in price controls leads to a reduction in unemployment by 0.1
percentage points. Finally, reducing bargaining coordination was successful in four of the five
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countries. A one point drop in the indicator value is related to a reduction in unemployment
between 0.19 and 1.43 percentage points. Concerning the preciseness of the estimated marginal
effects, the standard errors are comparably high especially for labour taxes and employment
protection for all five countries, and for bargaining coordination for Spain and bargaining
coordination for Australia. The remaining institutional marginal effects are estimated with
high precision.
The effects are substantial for some reform components and for some countries. Never-
theless, especially the marginal effects of changes in employment protection and bargaining
coordination should be interpreted with caution. Both indicators are rather crude measures.
For the remaining institutional variables, the marginal effects provide a reasonable approxima-
tion for potential changes in unemployment following a labour market reform.
6.2 GMM
The fixed effects estimates could be biased due to the correlation of the lagged dependent vari-
able with the error term through the country-specific fixed effects. We therefore run the genetic
algorithm with the theoretically preferred system GMM estimator. Overall, the findings are
similar to the results produced with the fixed effects estimator. Still, seven interactions terms
are identified as relevant for explaining unemployment. However, the interactions between
employment protection and unemployment benefits as well as between unemployment benefits
and labour taxes are not selected within the GMM estimation. In contrast, the interactions
between employment protection and labour taxes as well as between employment protection,
unemployment benefits and labour taxes are chosen through the genetic algorithm. This change
in the selected model results in a slightly different pattern of positive marginal effects across
countries. The number of positive marginal effects, illustrated in the following table, increases
for employment protection from seven to 14, and for labour taxes from 19 to 20, while it de-
creases for unemployment benefits from nine to eight. The remaining numbers do not change.
The superiority of the GMM over the fixed effects estimator, however, hinges essentially on
assumptions which can be tested (see chapter 3 for a brief discussion). Unfortunately, already
the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions of the first-step estimator performs rather dubi-
ous since the p-value of this test equals 1 for virtually all models. This is a well-documented
shortcoming of the Hansen test (which is a more general form of the Sargan test based on
the estimated variances of the first-step estimation) in case of instrument proliferation. For
the Hansen test, reducing the set of instruments could alleviate the problem. However, this
should not be the case for the Sargan test. Estimating the second-step GMM estimator with a
collapsed instrument set and applying the Hansen test which is, in contrast to the Sargan test,
robust to heteroskedasticity would be a reasonable solution. We run the system GMM estima-
tion with a collapsed instrument set following Roodman (2009). As expected, the Hansen test
performs poorly and the findings are unstable. As already stated, the second-step weighting
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Table 5: Marginal institutional effects (GMM)
Employ-
ment
protection
Re-
place-
ment
rate
Labour
taxes
Bargain-
ing
coordina-
tion
Union
den-
sity
Product
market
regulation
Number of positive
marginal effects out of
26 countries
14 8 20 22 26 26
A positive marginal effect means that regulation (which means a higher level of the institu-
tional indicator) is linked to a higher unemployment rate. Correspondingly, deregulation is
then correlated with improved labour market performance.
matrix seems to be poorly identified which results in these unstable second-step estimates. We
therefore have to assume that the selected instruments are invalid, and that the system GMM
estimator does not provide reliable results for our model structure. Therefore, we trust the fixed
effects findings more. As a consequence, we accept the consequences of the potential Nickell
bias due to the dynamic structure of our model.
6.3 The role of gender
Up to now, we have focused on the aggregate unemployment rate as our variable of interest.
Nevertheless, recent research (Bertola et al., 2007; Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2005), for instance)
suggests that institutional changes affect distinct groups differently, depending on the respective
labour supply elasticities. Consequently, we expect that different models are selected once we
distinguish between the unemployment rates of males and females. According to Bertola et
al. (2007), we suppose that female employment react stronger to changes in the institutional
environment due to a more elastic labour supply. More specifically, the theoretical model of
Bertola et al. (2007) predicts that female employment reduces more than male employment
when stronger unions demand higher wages caused by the steeper labour supply function of
females. Hence, we assume that institutional changes which make the labour market more
flexible should reduce female employment more than male employment. In order to determine
the impact on unemployment, however, one has to take into account that unemployed might
leave the labour market and move into inactivity. A reduction in employment is not necessarily
related to an increase in unemployment as long as the new unemployed leave the labour market.
We assume that movements into inactivity are negligible, and that the drop in employment
translates into an increase in unemployment. This might likely be larger for female than for
male employees through flexibilisation. Consequently, we expect that the number of positive
marginal effects is larger for female than for male unemployment for all six indicators.
The following figure 1 gives an overview on the different marginal institutional effects for
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Figure 1: Number of positive marginal effects in 26 countries separated by gender
the unemployment rates of males and females, and for the aggregate unemployment rate. Over-
all, our hypothesis that there are more positive marginal effects for female unemployment only
holds for employment protection, bargaining coordination, and for product market regulation.
For unemployment benefits, labour taxes and union density, the positive marginal effects pre-
vail for male unemployment. The largest difference between male and female unemployment
can be documented for product market regulation. Female unemployed would benefit from a
deregulation in this category in 15 countries, while it would be 9 for male unemployment.
Similar to the aggregate unemployment rate, reductions in the level of regulation of labour
taxes, bargaining coordination, and union density would be successful in the majority of coun-
tries. The impact of deregulations of employment protection as well as unemployment benefits
is less clear, it heavily depends on the country-specific institutional framework. The findings
for product market regulation are somewhat surprising since the impact of an increase in com-
petition is homogeneously beneficial for aggregate unemployment. This is partly due to the
fact that product market regulation appears as a significant interaction partner in the models
for gender-specific unemployment.
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7 Conclusion
This paper analyses the impact of interdependencies between institutional factors for the evo-
lution of unemployment. Based on an innovative model selection approach, which is combined
with a classical dynamic fixed-effect estimator for a two-way error component model, higher-
order institutional interdependencies are identified for a panel of 26 countries ranging from 2001
to 2008. Thereby, we apply a genetic algorithm being a heuristic optimization method which
has not been used within the unemployment-institution literature. In contrast to the previous
literature, this paper is the first to focus on the impact of higher-order institutional interactions
on unemployment and one of the first to consider a dynamic model specification in the con-
text of institutional interactions. It thereby allows for a more precise and detailed analysis of
the impact of interdependencies between different labour market institutions on labour market
performance on a cross-country level.
The results suggest that there are substantial differences across countries in the labour mar-
ket impact of institutional changes for nearly all selected institutional indicators. Hence, the
impact of a reform of employment protection, unemployment benefits, labour taxes, bargain-
ing power, and bargaining coordination crucially depends on the country-specific institutional
setting.
Especially, reductions in labour taxes, bargaining power, product market regulation, and
bargaining coordination seem to be unemployment-reducing in the majority of countries. In
contrast, lowering employment protection and unemployment benefits are much less likely to
have the trivially expected consequences that deregulation is the road to success, although such
reforms would be beneficial in some countries.
It further stands out that five of the six institutional categories matter as conditioning fac-
tors. This is particularly relevant for theoretical models by providing, first, empirical evidence
that institutions are linked in a more sophisticated way than considered before, and, second,
empirical guidance which institutional factors should be considered in such interdependencies.
We further document that institutional changes have a heterogeneous impact on the male
and female unemployed. According to theory we expected that institutions positive marginal
effects in the majority of countries, especially compared to male unemployment. Indeed, we
confirm this hypothesis for three institutional factors; employment protection, bargaining co-
ordination, and product market regulation. However, we find a larger number of positive
marginal effects for unemployment benefits, labour taxes and bargaining coordination for male
unemployment. Hence, we document that institutional changes show a heterogeneous impact
not only across countries, but also across gender. Yet, the model setup with a specific set of
interactions has only limited power to explicitly identify the drivers for the distinct marginal
institutional effects for male and female unemployment.
Note that the findings should be interpreted with caution. Due to the lack of adequate
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instruments and the inability of the system GMM estimator to provide reliable results, no causal
relationship between institutions and unemployment can be set up. Furthermore, while the
selection of institutional factors is derived directly from theory, additional institutional factors
like active labour market policies or family policies might influence the findings. Nevertheless,
the findings provide robust evidence that (i) interdependencies are crucial for the labour market
effect of an institutional reform (ii) the order of interactions is rather high since five of six
considered factors are involved in relevant interaction terms and (iii) reform recommendations
should not be based on success stories from specific countries, but on an accurate evaluation of
the country-specific institutional setting.
While the findings provide reliable qualitative evidence on the role of institutional inter-
actions, improvements in data coverage and quality could pave the way to a more profound
quantitative analysis of conditional institutional effects on the labour market.
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Annex
Threshold Accepting (TA): The model structure is initialized randomly with a binary string
of zero and ones (ϕ0). Based on the randomly initialized model structure, the estimation is
performed and our objective function is calculated. This value and the model structure are
stored. After the initialization, the iterations start. In each iteration step a new solution (ϕ1)
which is a neighbour to the current solution is derived. Two regressors out of all potential
regressors are selected randomly. The following rule applies: The first regressor is included if
it was excluded before and the second vice versa. This corresponds to a Hamming Distance
of two. Based on this new structure, the new information criterion is calculated. Then, the
difference of the previous and the new value of the loss function is calculated. If the difference
is smaller than the corresponding value of the threshold sequence (τ) the new structure is
accepted else the previous combination is restored. We use a data-driven threshold sequence as
advocated by Winker and Fang (1997) which is based on differences of the objective function.
These are generated by running the algorithm without the acceptance criterion and taking
the difference of the initial value and new objective function. The threshold sequence for the
threshold accepting algorithm gets linearly lowered to zero within 60% as recommended by
Savin and Winker (2012). In each iteration step the elitist is preserved to account for potential
impairments of the objective function. The next iteration step follows until the predefined
number of iterations (Imax) is done.
Pseudocode for Threshold Accepting
1 Generate at random a solution ϕ0, initialize Imax and τ
2 for I = 1 to Imax do
3 Generate at random neighbor ϕ1 ∈ (ϕ0)
4 if f(ϕ0) - f(ϕ1) < τ then
5 ϕ0 = ϕ1, keep elitist
6 end if
7 Reduce τ
8 end for
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Table 6: Data summary statistics
Median Minimum Maximum S.D.
Unemployment rate 6.08 2.53 19.98 3.46
Employment protection 1.90 0.21 3.67 0.77
Net replacement rate 0.73 0.55 0.86 0.08
Labour taxes 0.35 0.10 0.49 0.10
Bargaining coordination 3.00 1.00 5.00 1.21
Union density 0.22 0.08 0.78 0.19
Product market regulation -6.60 -10 -4.10 0.89
Real exchange rate 0.00 -14.10 24.51 2.91
Productivity 4.83 4.51 5.01 0.11
Trade balance -0.02 -73.69 22.54 11.88
Output Gap 1.10 -4.54 9.00 2.35
Table 7: Correlation coefficients between institutions
EPL NRR TAX COO UDE PMR
Employment protection (EPL) 1.00 0.37 0.50 0.42 0.06 0.32
Net replacement rate (NRR) 1.00 0.21 0.38 0.36 -0.09
Labour taxes (TAX) 1.00 0.23 0.33 0.24
Bargaining coordination (BCO) 1.00 0.37 -0.02
Union density (UDE) 1.00 -0.38
Product market regulation (PMR) 1.00
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